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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal primarily requires us to decide whether the 
District Court erred in sentencing Toshia Watterson as if 
she had been convicted of, or had stipulated to, distributing 
a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone, 
when she had not. We find that the District Court erred in 
so doing and, accordingly, will vacate the sentence and 
remand for resentencing. 
 
I 
 
Beginning in 1995, Toshia Watterson ("Watterson") was 
involved with the "Massey Organization," a sophisticated 
drug trafficking ring in and around Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. Led by Derrick Massey, with Delbert Massey 
acting as his brother's right-hand man, the Massey 
Organization distributed drugs within 1000 feet of various 
public and parochial schools, among other locations. More 
specifically, the Organization obtained bulk quantities of 
marijuana and cocaine, broke them down into lesser 
quantities, and distributed the drugs primarily through 
three local bars -- the Hideaway Lounge, the 20 Plus Club 
and the Commodore Lounge -- all of which were located 
near those schools. Watterson, the girlfriend of Derrick 
Massey, at various times worked at all three of the 
aforementioned bars, and participated in the drug 
trafficking operation. 
 
On September 30, 1997, a thirty-one count indictment 
was returned against Watterson and nine others, including 
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the Massey brothers, based on their involvement in and 
with the Massey Organization. Specifically, Watterson was 
charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846 (Count One); 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) (Count Eighteen); possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1) (Count Nineteen); and criminal forfeiture, 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 853 (Count Twenty-Six). She was 
not charged with violating or conspiring to violate 21 U.S.C. 
S 860, which prohibits drug distribution "in or near" schools.1 
 
On April 3, 1998, Watterson pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and marijuana (Count One) and 
forfeiture (Count Twenty-Six). The other charges against her 
were subsequently dismissed. 
 
On June 26, 1998, Watterson was sentenced to fifteen 
months in prison.2 At sentencing, Watterson challenged the 
computation of what was to become her guideline 
imprisonment range, specifically the use of offense 
guideline S 2D1.2 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines,3 which, as relevant here, deals with drug 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 21 U.S.C. S 860, in its current form, states, as relevant here: 
 
       Distribution or manufacturing in or near schools and colleges 
 
       Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) . . . by distributing, 
       possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled 
       substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real 
property 
       comprising a public or private elementary, vocational, or secondary 
       school or a public or private college, junior college, or 
university, or 
       a playground, or housing facility owned by a public housing 
       authority, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth center, 
       public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is (except as 
provided 
       in subsection (b) of this section) subject to (1) twice the maximum 
       punishment authorized by section 841(b) of this title; and (2) at 
       least twice any term of supervised release authorized by section 
       841(b) of this title for a first offense[.] 
 
2. Based on a total offense level of fourteen and a criminal history 
category of I, Watterson's guideline imprisonment range was fifteen to 
twenty-one months. 
 
3. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 
("U.S.S.G.") (Nov. 1997). 
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offenses committed near "protected locations" such as 
schools and which, if applied, would result in a base 
offense level two levels higher than that called for under 
S 2D1.1.4 Watterson argued that S 2D1.2 was inapplicable 
because Appendix A (the "Statutory Index") of the 
Guidelines compels the use of S 2D1.1 rather than S 2D1.2 
as the guideline by which to set the base offense level 
when, as here, there was a 21 U.S.C. S 846 conspiracy to 
violate only 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and not 21 U.S.C. S 860. 
The District Court concluded, as had the Presentence 
Investigation Report, that S 2D1.2 was "applicable" but did 
not explain why it reached that conclusion. Presumably, it 
believed, as some other courts believe, that it was entitled 
to consider all relevant conduct in determining which 
offense guideline section should be selected in thefirst 
instance, and because the drug conspiracy operated in a 
school zone, S 2D1.2, the section listed in the Statutory 
Index as applicable to such violations, was most 
appropriate. The government agreed. We disagree. 
 
II 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.S 3742(a) and 
(e), and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review the District Court's 
legal construction of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. 
United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 1999). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. S 2D1.2. Drug Offenses Occurring Near Protected Locations or Involving 
       Underage or Pregnant Individuals; Attempt or Conspiracy 
 
       (a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest): 
 
       (1) 2 plus the offense level from S 2D1.1 applicable to the 
quantity 
       of controlled substances directly involving a protected location or 
       an underage or pregnant individual; or 
 
       (2) 1 plus the offense level from S 2D1.1 applicable to the total 
       quantity of controlled substances involved in the offense; or 
 
       (3) 26, if the offense involved a person less than eighteen years 
of 
       age; or 
 
       (4) 13, otherwise. 
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The issue presented, i.e. whether S 2D1.2, rather than 
S 2D1.1,5 is the applicable offense guideline section for a 
defendant who has not stipulated or pled guilty to, or been 
convicted at trial of, a violation of S 860 has caused a 
circuit split. In sum, the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits ("the majority") do not permit the use of S 2D1.2 in 
such a case, see United States v. Crawford, 185 F.3d 1024 
(9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311 
(11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Chandler, 125 F.3d 892 
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Locklear, 24 F.3d 641 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 978 (1994); while the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits ("the minority") do. See United States v. 
Benjamin, 138 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Clay, 117 F.3d 317 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 962 
(1997); United States v. Oppedahl, 998 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
 
Subsumed within the question of which offense guideline 
section is applicable is a broader guideline dispute: at what 
point is "relevant conduct" factored in? Should relevant 
conduct be considered at the outset in determining the 
applicable offense guideline section or may it only be 
considered once that guideline section has been 
determined? Indeed, it is this broader dispute over the use 
of relevant conduct which has caused the majority and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. S 2D1.1. Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking 
       (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); 
Attempt 
       or Conspiracy 
 
       (a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest): 
 
       (1) 43, if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. S 
841(b)(1)(A), 
       (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or 
(b)(3), and 
       the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily 
       injury resulted from the use of the substance and that the 
       defendant committed the offense after one or more prior 
       convictions for a similar offense; or 
 
       (2) 38, if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. S 
841(b)(1)(A), 
       (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or 
(b)(3), and 
       the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily 
       injury resulted from the use of the substance; or 
 
       (3) the offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set 
forth 
       in subsection (c) below. 
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minority to come to different conclusions. See Crawford, 
185 F.3d at 1026 ("These circuits arrive at different results 
because they disagree about the role of `relevant conduct' in 
selecting the applicable offense guideline section."). 
 
We join the majority and conclude, based on our analysis 
of the Guidelines, that the applicable offense guideline 
section for a defendant who has not been convicted of 21 
U.S.C. S 860 or stipulated to having committed a drug 
offense in or near a school zone is S 2D1.1. We also 
conclude that relevant conduct is factored in, if at all, only 
after the appropriate offense guideline section is selected.6 
 
The Framework 
 
While the Guidelines describe a nine-step process by 
which to arrive at a sentencing range, seeS 1B1.1, only the 
first two steps are relevant here. According toS 1B1.1(a), 
the District Court first selects the offense guideline section 
applicable to the offense of conviction. SeeS 1B1.1(a). 
"Because it channels the remainder of the sentencing 
process, selection of the correct offense guideline section is 
critically important." Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314. The 
Guidelines instruct the Court to select 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The circuit split will be resolved in favor of the majority view on 
November 1, 2000 when, unless modified or rejected by Congress, a 
proposed amendment to SS 1B1.1, 1B1.2 and the Statutory Index's 
introductory commentary becomes effective. In its synopsis of the 
proposed amendment, the Sentencing Commission explained that 
 
       [t]he clarification [of the inter-relationship among these 
provisions] 
       is intended to emphasize that the sentencing court must apply the 
       offense guideline referenced in the Statutory Index for the statute 
of 
       conviction unless the case falls within the limited`stipulation' 
       exception set forth in S 1B1.2(a). Therefore, in order for the 
       enhanced penalties in S 2D1.2 to apply, the defendant must be 
       convicted of an offense referenced to S 2D1.2, rather than simply 
       have engaged in conduct described by that guideline. Furthermore, 
       the amendment deletes Application Note 3 of S 1B1.2 (Applicable 
       Guidelines), which provided that in many instances it would be 
       appropriate for the court to consider the actual conduct of the 
       offender, even if such conduct did not constitute an element of the 
       offense. 
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       the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense 
       Conduct) most applicable to the offense of conviction 
       (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the 
       indictment . . . of which the defendant was convicted). 
       Provided, however, in the case of a plea agreement 
       . . . containing a stipulation that specifically 
       establishes a more serious offense than the offense of 
       conviction, [the Court must] determine the offense 
       guideline section in Chapter Two most applicable to the 
       stipulated offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a)(emphasis in original); see also U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.2, comment. (n.1). The Statutory Index points the 
Court to the applicable offense guideline section in Chapter 
Two. 
 
Next, the Court determines the base offense level and 
applies any appropriate specific offense characteristics, 
cross references, and special instructions contained in the 
offense guideline section, as well as any other applicable 
sentencing factors pursuant to the definition of relevant 
conduct. See SS 1B1.1(b), 1B1.3. Only at this point may the 
Court factor in relevant conduct. See United States v. 
Lawton, 193 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999); Crawford, 
185 F.3d at 1028; Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1316 ("[I]n relying 
on the concept of relevant conduct in order to justify 
applying S 2D1.2 to convictions under S 841(a)(1), [the 6th 
and 8th Circuits] ignore the fact that the concept of 
relevant conduct does not come into play until  the correct 
offense guideline has been selected")(emphasis in original); 
Chandler, 125 F.3d at 897-98; United States v. Goldfaden, 
959 F.2d 1324, 1329 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States 
v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 372 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997)("[A] 
sentencing court can look to relevant conduct only to 
answer the questions posed by the relevant guidelines."). If 
the Court deems conduct to be relevant in any of the 
enumerated ways,7 the appropriate adjustments are made. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "Relevant conduct" is broadly defined to include: 
 
       [A]ll acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, 
       commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the 
       defendant; and in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity 
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The Framework Applied 
 
Step One 
 
Based on this framework, the District Court in choosing 
the applicable offense guideline section was obligated to 
 
look at the crime of which Watterson was convicted or at a 
more serious crime had she stipulated to such a crime. 
 
It is undisputed that, despite the fact that the conspiracy 
to which Watterson pled guilty operated within 1000 feet of 
a school zone, Watterson was not charged with or convicted 
 
of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in or near 
a school zone, a violation of 21 U.S.C. S 860, but, rather, a 
21 U.S.C. S 846 "conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
 
marijuana," in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Section 
860 is a substantive offense which requires proof of an 
element not included in S 841, as courts have"uniformly 
 
held," and not simply "an enhancement provision." United 
States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 826 (1996). We are not, therefore, free to disregard 
the government's charging decision, or Watterson's plea of 
 
guilty. Moreover, the Statutory Index specifically refers a 
violation of S 841(a) to S 2D1.1, while it refers a violation of 
S 860 to S 2D1.2. Concomitantly, S 2D1.1 includes S 841 
but not S 860 as one of the statutory provisions to which it 
is applicable and S 2D1.2 includes S 860 but not S 841. 
 
Because a S 846 conspiracy to violate S 841(a)(1), and not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the 
       defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
       conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of 
others 
       in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that 
       occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in 
       preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to 
avoid 
       detection or responsibility for that offense; . . . all harm that 
       resulted from [those] acts and omissions . . ., and all harm that 
was 
       the object of such acts and omissions; and any other information 
       specified in the applicable guideline. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a). 
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S 860, is what was charged and pled to here, the 
appropriate offense guideline section was S 2D1.1.8 
 
The government argues, however, and the District Court 
apparently believed, that relevant conduct -- which, here, 
at least arguably includes the school zone distributions -- 
may be taken into account in choosing the applicable 
offense guideline section. To support this argument, it 
contends, as do the courts in the minority, that the 
Statutory Index is non-exhaustive and that an offense 
guideline section other than that or those listed for a 
particular statute may be more appropriate based on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In terms of selecting the offense guideline section, the Statutory 
Index 
lists S 2D1.2 as also applicable to violations of S 846 and, thus, the use 
of S 2D1.2 might seem appropriate. See Crawford, 185 F.3d at 1028-29 
(S 846 would permit use of S 2D1.2 if the school zone conduct was an 
object of the conspiracy). What is relevant in selecting the offense 
guideline section is not S 846, per se, but, rather, the underlying object 
of the conspiracy, which the government does not argue was the 
distribution of drugs in or near a school zone. See S 2X1.1(a) and 
comment. (n.2); United States v. Takahashi, 205 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th 
Cir. 2000)(holding, in case where object of S 846 conspiracy did not 
include distributing drugs in or near a school zone, that S 2D1.1 rather 
than S 2D1.2 was the most applicable guideline section); Crawford, 185 
F.3d at 1028-29 ("[The] court must necessarily consider the object of the 
conspiracy to determine which guideline is `most applicable to the 
offense of conviction."); see also Saavedra , 148 F.3d at 1315 n.4 ("The 
Statutory Index lists both S 2D1.2 and S 2D1.1, among several others, as 
applicable to convictions under 21 U.S.C. S 846. This does not support 
the contention of the United States that Saavedra can be sentenced 
under S 2D1.2 for a S 846 conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). The 
captions to S 2D1.1 and S 2D1.2 indicate that they are intended to apply 
to both substantive violations of the statutory provisions on which they 
are based as well as to conspiracies to violate those provisions. Thus, 
the 
Statutory Index intends S 2D1.2 to apply only to S 846 conspiracies to 
violate 21 U.S.C. SS 859, 860, or 861."); Locklear, 24 F.3d at 648 n.4 
("We note that Appendix A lists section 2D1.2 as applicable to 
convictions under 21 U.S.C. S 846. We believe, however, that this is 
intended to refer only to convictions for conspiring to violate 21 U.S.C. 
S[S ] 859, 860 or 861. Indeed, as noted in the text, the captions to 
section 2D1.1 and 2D1.2 clearly indicate that they are intended to apply 
both to substantive violations of the statutory provisions upon which 
they are premised and to conspiratorial and attempted violations 
thereof."). 
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surrounding facts. Simply put, to the minority,"the Index 
merely points the court in the right direction; its 
suggestions are advisory; what ultimately controls is the 
`most applicable guideline.' " Crawford , 185 F.3d at 1026-27 
n.7 (citation omitted); Clay, 117 F.3d at 319 (citing 
commentary note 3 to S 1B1.1 which "clearly states that 
`[t]he list of `Statutory Provisions' in the Commentary to 
each offense guideline does not necessarily include every 
statute covered by that guideline.' "). 
 
While we agree that the Statutory Index is not definitive 
but, rather, to be used for guidance, we are also convinced 
that it should only be disregarded in the " `atypical case' in 
which the guideline specified in the Statutory Index is 
`inappropriate.' " Crawford, 185 F.3d at 1026-27 n.7. 
Deference should be paid to the Statutory Index where it 
points to an offense guideline section. See Saavedra 148 
F.3d at 1315-16 ("[U]nder the doctrine of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius, the express indication that an offense 
guideline section applies to several statutes of conviction 
`strongly suggests' that it does not apply to a statute that 
is not listed")(citation omitted). As the Second Circuit 
stated: 
 
       We do not understand [commentary note 3] to mean 
       that whenever a defendant's total criminal conduct 
       includes some acts that constitute an offense more 
       serious than the offense of conviction, the guideline for 
       the more serious offense may be used[.] Instead, we 
       understand the exception described in Appendix A to 
       cover those cases, probably few in number, where the 
       conduct constituting the offense of conviction also 
       constitutes another, more serious offense, thereby 
       rendering the offense conduct not typical of the usual 
       means of committing the offense of conviction. 
 
United States v. Elefant, 999 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1993). 
We are not persuaded that this is an "atypical case" in 
which the Statutory Index's "strong suggestion" of S 2D1.1 
can be cast away and S 2D1.2 applied instead. See 
Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1315 (rejecting same argument and 
agreeing that a crime of this type does not present an 
"atypical case").9 Rather, this is a garden variety drug 
distribution case to which S 2D1.1 applies. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Additionally, in order to apply S 2D1.2 to a S 841 offense, or a 
conspiracy to violate S 841, the courts in the minority look to 
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The government also points us to commentary note 6 to 
S 1B1.3, which states that, "[u]nless .. . an express 
direct[ion] [requiring conviction under a statutory provision] 
is included [in a particular guideline], conviction under the 
statute is not required." Oppedahl, 998 F.2d at 587 n.4 
(citing S 1B1.3, comment. (n.6)); Clay, 117 F.3d at 319 
(same). Based on that statement, the government argues 
that the District Court was entitled to determine that the 
location of the distribution conspiracy within one or more 
school zones made S 2D1.2 more appropriate than S 2D1.1. 
Thus, the argument goes, without the Statutory Index as an 
obstacle, the District Court was free to selectS 2D1.2, 
particularly here where paragraph twelve of the"Manner 
and Means" section of the indictment describes the 
proximity of the distribution activities to various schools. 
Cf. Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314 (finding the application of 
S 2D1.2 inappropriate and noting that the indictment did 
"not mention the proximity of [the elementary school] to the 
drug activity, and it [did] not even give the specific location 
of the drug activity from which such proximity could be 
learned or inferred."). 
 
We find compelling, however, the Fourth Circuit's 
conclusion that commentary note 6 to S 1B1.3 
 
       is intended only to apply where a reference to a 
       particular statutory provision appears within the actual 
       body of a guideline. To hold that the various guidelines 
       of Chapter Two may apply regardless of whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"Application Note 3 to S 1B1.2 [which] states that in determining the 
applicable guideline, it is `appropriate that the court consider the 
actual 
conduct of the offender, even when such conduct does not constitute an 
element of the offense.' " Clay, 117 F.3d at 319 (citing U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2 
comment. (n.3)). The Clay court has, however, misapplied Application 
Note 3. It is very clear from S 1B1.2 that relevant conduct is not 
recognized until "after determining the appropriate offense guideline 
section." S 1B1.2(b); United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 
1998)(citing same provision with regard to base offense level 
determination). Commentary note 3, therefore, when read in context, 
obviously applies to S 1B1.2(b), and not S 1B1.2(a) and, thus, does not 
factor into "determining the applicable guideline." Clay, 117 F.3d at 319 
(emphasis added). 
 
                                11 
  
       defendant has been convicted of the statutory 
       provisions underlying those guidelines would effectively 
       turn the Chapter Two guidelines into a series of 
       specific offense characteristics, a result we do not 
       believe the Sentencing Commission to have 
       contemplated. Indeed, the language quoted in the text 
       from application note 2 to section 1B1.2 is inconsistent 
       with this notion. 
 
Locklear, 24 F.3d at 648-49 n.5 (emphasis in original). "In 
other words, the defendant's `relevant conduct' is actually 
irrelevant to determining the applicable offense guideline 
section." Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1317. 
 
For all of the above reasons, therefore, S 2D1.1 was the 
applicable offense guideline section here. We are not quite 
through, however. As noted above, had Watterson 
stipulated to committing a more serious offense, the offense 
guideline section selected could and should have reflected 
that offense. This Court has recently discussed the 
requisites of a stipulation pursuant to S 1B1.2(a). See 
United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 1999). We 
concluded that "where the parties drafted and agreed to a 
document that explicitly contained all of the relevant 
stipulations between them, it is clear that their`deal' 
encompassed only those stipulations contained in that 
document." Nathan, 188 F.3d at 200-01. We made clear 
that issues emerging in factual basis colloquies are not 
stipulations. See id. at 193, 201; see also United States v. 
Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir.)(" `[O]nce the Government 
agrees to a plea bargain without extracting such an 
admission [regarding a more serious offense], facts 
admitted by the defendant to shorten or obviate a 
sentencing hearing do not establish a `stipulated offense' 
within the meaning of section 1B1.2(a).' ")(citing United 
States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1988)), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 829 (1990). 
 
Watterson did not stipulate to distribution within a 
school zone; indeed, the stipulations in her plea agreement, 
which constituted the parties' entire agreement, did not 
even mention a school zone. Simply agreeing, when asked, 
with the location in which the conspiracy operated did not 
a stipulation make. See, e.g., Crawford, 185 F.3d at 1027 
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n.8 (noting that plea agreement did not include stipulation 
to a more serious offense even though defendant was 
originally indicted for violating S 860); Saavedra, 148 F.3d 
at 1314 (finding that Saavedra "never made the sort of 
formal stipulation that would support sentencing him for a 
violation of S 860" despite conceding at sentencing that the 
activities took place within the requisite proximity to the 
school). For this reason as well, S 2D1.1, and not S 2D1.2, 
is the applicable offense guideline section. See Crawford, 
185 F.3d at 1027 n.8 (denying use of S 2D1.2 in case in 
which indictment charged violation of S 860 but defendant 
pleaded guilty to S 841 offense). 
 
Step Two 
 
It is at step two, where the Court determines the base 
offense level, when relevant conduct may be taken into 
account. Again, conduct is "relevant" if it relates to: 
 
       (1) calculating the base offense level, (2) considering 
       the specific offense characteristics set forth in the 
       particular guideline, (3) considering any cross- 
       references contained in the particular guideline, and (4) 
       making any adjustments authorized by Chapter Three. 
 
Chandler, 125 F.3d 897-98 (citing S 1B1.3(a)). As the Fifth 
Circuit noted in Chandler, the location of t 
